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Abstract 
 
  
The penal system has played a central role in the North Korean government’s response to 
the country’s profound economic and social changes. Two refugee surveys—one 
conducted in China, one in South Korea—document its changing role. The regime 
disproportionately targets politically suspect groups, particularly those involved in 
market-oriented economic activities. Levels of violence and deprivation do not appear to 
differ substantially between the infamous political prison camps, penitentiaries for felons, 
and labor camps used to incarcerate individuals for misdemeanors, including economic 
crimes. Substantial numbers of those incarcerated report experiencing deprivation with 
respect to food as well as public executions and other forms of violence. This repression 
appears to work; despite substantial cynicism about the North Korean system, refugees 
do not report signs of collective action aimed at confronting the regime.  
Such a system may also reflect ulterior motives. High levels of discretion with 
respect to arrest and sentencing and very high costs of detention, arrest and incarceration 
encourage bribery; the more arbitrary and painful the experience with the penal system, 
the easier it is for officials to extort money for avoiding it. These characteristics not only 
promote regime maintenance through intimidation, but may facilitate predatory 
corruption as well. 
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In the last decade, a variety of sources have allowed analysts to piece together an 
increasingly clear picture of North Korea’s penal system. Technology has played a 
surprising role in this process; satellite imagery, including images secured through 
providers such as DigitalGlobe and Google Earth, have permitted a precise mapping of 
the country’s gulag. Yet at the core of our understanding is information provided by 
refugees, including both prisoners and guards, who have managed to flee North Korea. 
This information has appeared in the form of memoirs (Kang 2001), unstructured 
interviews (Hawk 2003; Muico 2007; KINU 2009), and databases of individual cases of 
human rights violations (Database Center for North Korean Human Rights 2008). The 
portrait that emerges is of a Soviet-style gulag characterized by an arbitrary judicial 
system, an expansive conception of crime, and horrific abuses. These abuses include 
extreme deprivation, particularly with respect to food and medical treatment, torture and 
public executions.  
 The penal system is by no means limited to the political prison camps, however. 
The evolution of the prison system also cannot be understood without reference to 
profound economic and social changes that have occurred in North Korean over the last 
decade and the government’s repressive response to them. During the 1990s, famine 
killed between 600,000 and 1,000,000 people, 3-5 percent of the population (Haggard 
and Noland 2007). While authorities blamed the collapse of the food economy on 
weather, the famine was a classic case of state failure. As the state proved unable to 
provide food through socialist distribution networks, the economy underwent a process of 
marketization from below. Small-scale social units—households, factories and 
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cooperatives, local government and party offices, even military units—began engaging in 
entrepreneurial behavior—much of it technically illegal—in order to survive. 
This unplanned and unwanted marketization eroded state control of the economy 
and therefore over pathways to wealth, prestige, and ultimately power. Not surprisingly, 
the regime’s response to this process has been ambivalent. At times, the government has 
acquiesced to the facts on the ground through reforms that decriminalized market activity.  
At other times it has sought to turn back the clock and reconstitute the socialist system 
through a revival of the state sector and the imposition of controls on private activity. 
The penal system has played a central role in the government’s repressive 
response to economic and social change. During the famine, the state established an 
extensive system of low-level labor training facilities (ro-dong-dan-ryeon-dae) to 
manage the unprecedented movement and market activity that sprung up as heavily-
affected segments of the population literally wandered the countryside in search of food 
(Noland 2000). A 2004 legal reform regularized these facilities and specified “labor 
training” for up to two years as punishment for a wide variety of crimes, including a 
growing number of economic and social crimes (Han 2006). Crossing the border into 
China was always a very serious offense. As the number of refugees fleeing to China 
increased, these facilities also played an important role in managing those captured in 
route or repatriated by Chinese authorities.  
As the state has attempted to reassert control over society in the decade since the 
end of the famine, the penal system has evolved accordingly. Two refugee surveys, one 
conducted in China, the other in South Korea, suggest a system characterized by high 
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rates of arbitrary detention and release. Horrific abuses are characteristic not only of the 
camps for political prisoners, but at all levels of the penal system.  
In a survey of more than 1,300 refugees conducted in China between August 2004 
and September 2005, roughly one-quarter reported having been arrested in China and 
repatriated to North Korea and nearly 10 percent of the respondents reported 
incarceration in correctional and political detention facilities. Among this latter group, 90 
percent reported witnessing forced starvation, 60 percent deaths due to beating or torture, 
and 27 percent executions. A second survey of 300 refugees conducted in South Korea in 
November 2008 confirmed these results. Just over one-third had been detained in the 
penal system and similar numbers reported witnessing extreme forms of abuse.1  
Such surveys are susceptible to self-selection bias:  refugees may leave precisely 
because of the intensity of their ill-treatment and disaffection.  Those who undertake the 
risks of trying to leave North Korea probably have some otherwise unobserved individual 
characteristics that differentiate them from the rest of the population. These may include 
more adverse life experiences and more severely truncated opportunities, both of which 
could give rise to behaviors and attitudes that are quite different from the population as a 
whole. The survey presented below may thus accurately capture the experiences of the 
refugee community in South Korea, but may provide a limited perspective on North 
                                                 
1
 The more secure legal environment in South Korea enabled us to administer a longer 
questionnaire asking more detailed questions about initial arrest and detention, the precise 
facilities in which they were held, and the conditions they witnessed while incarcerated. 
The experiences of this second sample largely confirm that of our first survey, but also 
provide more detailed information on both constant and changing features of the North 
Korean police state. 
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Korea.2 However, there are some reasons to believe that the sources of bias are somewhat 
less pronounced than might be thought. Refugees are asked questions not only about their 
own experience but their observation of others’ experiences as well. Moreover, there is 
strong evidence that the punishment of border-crossing is now being treated in ways that 
resemble a widening array of other economic and social crimes that are associated with 
the process we describe as “marketization from below.” The penal system appears to 
process large numbers of people engaged in illicit activities for relatively short periods, 
exposing inmates to terrible abuses. This pattern not only serves to intimidate; other 
research we have conducted on the pervasiveness of corruption suggests that abusive 
treatment may also benefit corrupt officials extracting bribes from those seeking to avoid 
entanglement with the penal system.  
The repressive apparatus also appears to work. Our surveys uncover deep 
dissatisfaction with the North Korean regime. Respondents are also highly cynical about 
the regime’s arguments that controls are necessitated by the country’s adverse security 
environment. Yet the surveys also reveal a highly atomized society in which barriers to 
collective action are profound.   
 We begin with a brief overview of the North Korean penal system, the variety of 
different facilities and their administration and purposes. We then turn to a descriptive 
overview of respondents’ experiences with the penal system. A striking finding is that the 
                                                 
2
 A second, more tractable issue is that the population of refugees may not be 
demographically representative of the resident, non-refugee population, over-representing 
particular segments of the population such as women, or people from particular 
occupational categories. The problem can in principle be addressed ex post using 
multivariate techniques, as done in Chang, Haggard, and Noland (2009) and Haggard and 
Noland (2009a) where this source of potential bias in these surveys was shown to be 
negligible. 
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conditions that are frequently seen as characteristic of the country’s infamous gulag of 
political penal-labor colonies--such as extreme deprivation and exposure to violence--in 
fact pertain across the penal system, from the penitentiaries designed to house felons to 
lower-level jails and the new labor training facilities.  
 We then explore some of the determinants of incarceration. There is some 
evidence that this repressive apparatus disproportionately targets politically contestable 
groups, the “wavering” class in North Korean parlance, and particularly those involved in 
economic activities beyond direct state control. Sadly, as discussed in the penultimate 
section, this repressive apparatus appears to pose an effective deterrent to collective 
action although certainly not to disaffection.   
   
The North Korean Penal System 
 
As would be expected of a highly repressive regime, the North Korean legal and penal 
system is differentiated and complex.3 In the first instance, political crimes are treated 
very differently from ordinary crimes, with very much more severe punishments. Yet 
since the onset of the famine and increasing marketization of the economy, the legal and 
penal system has also had to cope with an explosion of economic and social crimes that 
are peculiar to a state-socialist system. These crimes ultimately reflect the inability of the 
official state sector to provide employment and basic necessities, including food. Some of 
these crimes involve theft or diversion of state property and assets; others simply reflect 
                                                 
3
 The Korean Institute for National Unification (KINU)’s White Papers on Human Rights 
in North Korea provides the most consistent and detailed information on changes in the 
legal and penal system.   
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the efforts on the part of households, and even work and military units, to engage in 
various income-earning activities.  
 From the perspective of the regime, however, even these latter activities can pose 
political as well as economic challenges. For example, people engaged in unauthorized 
private enterprise and trading do not show up at their work units. Their activities are also 
difficult to tax. As a result, authorities have incentives to punish both failure to appear at 
work and the associated private activity. Illegal movement is also an important feature of 
the new economy, including leaving one’s home without appropriate travel permits, 
overstaying travel permits or leaving the country without authorization. This last offense 
is of obvious significance to our consideration of refugees, as many of them seek to leave 
North Korean and are either caught in transit or are forcibly repatriated by Chinese 
authorities.  
 More serious economic crimes include diversion of state output to private use, 
including food grown on cooperatives, and the illegal use, profiteering from, or even sale 
of state assets. Some of these crimes are managed through increasingly institutionalized 
administrative punishments, but others are handled through the criminal justice system. 
In the 1999 criminal code, the “Chapter on Offenses against the Management of the 
Socialist Economy” included eight articles. In 2004, it was re-titled “the Chapter on 
Offenses against the Management of the Economy” and included seventy-four. It is 
noteworthy that this revision of the criminal code came only two years after the initiation 
of the most significant reform effort in the post-1990 period. 
 The most notorious component of the North Korean prison system is the massive 
kwan-li-so, variously translated as political prison camps, labor colonies, or concentration 
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camps; we will refer to them as political penal-labor camps. The number of these camps 
has recently been consolidated from 14 to about five large sites; one camp (Camp 22 near 
the Chinese border) is estimated to be 31 miles long and 25 miles wide and to hold 
50,000 inmates (Harden 2009). With one exception, these camps are administered by the 
National Security Agency (NSA), an agency with wide-ranging external and internal 
security functions that include border and immigration control.4  
 The political penal-labor camps are reserved for those deemed to pose a direct 
political threat to the regime. This group initially included counter-revolutionary social 
forces such as landlords, the religiously active and members of purged political factions. 
Over time, it came to encompass anyone guilty or suspected of political or ideological 
crimes. Those with extensive knowledge of life outside Korea have been particularly 
vulnerable to incarceration in these facilities, including repatriated Japanese-Koreans, 
those who have studied abroad and those accused of “trafficking” people out of North 
Korea. When asked if they were aware of the kwan-li-so, 77 percent of the respondents in 
the South Korean survey answered affirmatively. When asked if they thought that those 
sent there were incarcerated justly, 93 percent responded “no.” 
 A distinctive feature of the management of political crimes is that there is little 
pretense of due process. Political crimes appear to fall outside of criminal statute 
altogether and are managed with a high level of discretion by the NSA. The NSA either 
apprehends those accused of political crimes directly or they are remanded to NSA 
                                                 
4
 A useful summary of the history and functions of the NSA can be found in Namgung 
Min, “What Kind of Organization is North Korea’s National Security Agency?” 
DailyNK, September 9, 2007 
at http://www.dailynk.com/english/read.php?cataId=nk00400&num=2645.  
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custody; the NSA operates its own interim detention centers, including several dedicated 
to those caught attempting to cross the border or those caught and repatriated by Chinese 
authorities (Muico 2007). Prisoners accused of political crimes are detained in these 
interim facilities and tortured to extract confessions.  
 Once a case is deemed political, the National Security Agency also assumes 
control of the prosecutorial process. A prosecutor from the NSA will hand down 
sentences in a closed-door local court session in the name of the Central Court in 
Pyongyang, including the decision of whether to imprison the criminal for life and 
whether the criminal’s family will also be sent with him; group punishment in the form of 
incarceration of extended family and confiscation of property is a distinctive feature of 
the management of political crimes and incarceration in the political penal-labor camps. 
 Inmates of the kwan-il-so are typically incarcerated under prolonged or lifetime 
sentences at hard labor in mining, logging, and farming enterprises in the highly 
inhospitable north and north-central part of the country.5 Prisoners are also kept on 
starvation rations and many die of malnutrition and disease. Not surprisingly, the number 
of escapees from these camps is small; of the 300 refugees interviewed in the 2008 South 
Korea-based survey, only three report internment in a kwan-il-so.6  
                                                 
5
 . Only in two kwan-il-so is there reported evidence of efforts at political re-education.  
6
 . Unfortunately, we have no information on the conditions under which these three were 
either released or escaped, but curiously the length of their incarceration does not differ 
significantly from that of the other respondents: one reported incarceration between one 
and five years, one of less than a year, but one reported being in a kwan-il-so for less than 
a week. It is clearly difficult to draw inferences from three respondents, although the 
survivor testimony from these camps on these issues is now fairly extensive. See 
particularly Hawk 2003.  
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 A second component of the penal system is the kyo-hwa-so--literally, a “place to 
make someone better through education”--and sometimes translated as correctional or re-
education centers. In fact, there is little evidence from other refugee testimony that these 
facilities perform correctional or re-education functions. Superficially, they resemble 
prisons for housing felons and we will refer to them as penitentiaries. Prisoners in the 
kyo-hwa-so penitentiaries are presumably arrested for violations of the DPRK criminal 
code,7 subjected to a judicial process and given fixed-term sentences, which are 
described as “limited” if they are under 15 years and “unlimited” if longer than 15 years.
The kyo-hwa-so are administered by the People’s Safety Agency, the national police
 
 
rce.  
al 
 the 
  
-so 
 
                                                
fo
 However, there are predictable differences with penitentiaries in other pen
systems. First, the definition of felony crimes in North Korea includes a range of 
activities which appear political rather than criminal: “anti-state, anti-people crimes,” 
“crimes injurious to socialist culture,” and so on (Table 1). Hawk (2003, 46) describes
case of a woman imprisoned in a kyo-hwa-so penitentiary who had been convicted of 
disturbing the “socialist order” for singing a South Korean pop song in a private home.
 As in the political penal-labor camps (kwan-li-so), prisoners in the kyo-hwa
penitentiaries are compelled to perform hard labor. Satellite imagery and refugee 
testimony reveal that they are typically maximum-security compounds that combine 
buildings housing prisoners and administration with work units; some are located near
mine faces. Refugees with experience in them report that they are subjected to brutal 
 
7
 In addition to the police, there are standing “anti-socialist inspection groups” consisting 
of party and government officials and the prosecutorial office that are involved in 
monitoring of illicit activities, including border crossing. 
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treatment and torture and deprived of adequate food and medical care. Many inmates do 
not live to serve out their sentences and escape may even be more difficult than from the 
sprawling political penal-labor camps (Hawk 2003, Muico 2007, KINU 2009, 97-101).
the 2008 survey,
 In 
 9 percent of those incarcerated report spending time in a kyo-hwa-so 
eniten
of 
 for 
orcibly repatriated from China are also transferred to the jip-kyul-
o colle
re not 
and 
ctivity, 
p tiary.   
 The third and fourth components of the North Korean penal system that we 
consider manage lower-level crimes and misdemeanors. The jip-kyul-so or “collection 
centers” house low- or misdemeanor-level criminals for periods of up to six months 
hard labor. As KINU (2009, 95) describes this level of the penal system, “the cases 
handled by ‘collection centers’ include those whose crimes are not serious enough
[kyo-hwa-so penitentiaries] but too serious to send off to ‘labor training camps.’” 
Examples would include violating a designated or restricted area or overstaying travel 
permits, but the KINU report also lists absence from work or group training sessions. 
Some North Koreans f
s ction centers.  
 Finally, in addition to the collection centers for incarceration for lower-level 
offenses there has been an explosive growth of ro-dong-dan-ryeon-dae or labor-training 
centers, a network of facilities that dates to the 1990s. The labor-training centers we
initially a statutory feature of the penal system. Rather, they emerged as an ad hoc 
response on the part of authorities to the fraying of socialist control during the famine 
in its immediate aftermath, including unauthorized movement, black market a
border-crossing and the other economic crimes listed above (Noland 2000).  
 11
 The ro-dong-dan-ryeon-dae labor-training centers are operated at the municipal 
level, and in effect constitute mobile labor brigades of relatively small numbers of 
prisoners--30 to 60—typically held for less than six months in small, minimally-gua
and fenceless compounds. If not apprehended locally, these prisoners have already be
through interrogations and been shipped back to their hometowns for final release.  
Sometimes the detainees in the labor-training centers are even allowed to go to their 
homes for food or to recover from illness. Detainees resem
rded 
en 
ble corvee labor: they do road 
n 
g, 
icitly introduced as a new form of punishment and the 
lized 
). 
ains 
a crime in the 2004 penal code, which provides ample discretion for penalties up to, and 
repair, construction, and substitute for the lack of other forms of energy and transport i
the face of shortages, for example, by pushing train cars.  
 From 2001, this sort of labor training emerged more formally as the preferred 
sentence for dealing not only with petty crimes, including hoodlumism and racketeerin
but for the growing range of economic crimes as well. In the 2004 revision of the penal 
code, “labor training” was expl
existence of the ro-dong-dan-ryeon-dae labor training centers therefore institutiona
(Han 2006; KINU 2009, 90).  
  Labor-training centers have played a particularly important role in the 
management of those caught crossing the border or repatriated from China (Muico 2007
Leaving the country without permission was initially considered equivalent to treason. Of 
necessity, the government has been forced to soften this stance. The 1999 criminal law 
revision first distinguished defectors leaving for a subversive purpose from migrants who 
illegally leave the country largely for economic reasons; those in the first category were 
subject to very much harsher punishments.  Traveling abroad without permission rem
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including, death if such activity is deemed to have a national security or anti-regime 
dimension (Article 62). However, Article 223 of the revised penal code of 2004 permits 
h 
 
enal-
 
collection centers (jip-kyul-
) or l
 
g 
rcent of the entire 300 person sample, 
inal 
tivities that are subject to labor training under the 
vised criminal code (Table 1).  
sentences of up to two years in a ro-dong-dan-ryeon-dae labor training center.  
 Initial screening of repatriated North Koreans typically includes extensive 
questioning at special National Security Agency detention facilities about contact wit
South Koreans while in China or exposure to South Korean propaganda, broadcasts, 
movies or music; those deemed to be involved in these more serious political offenses are
liable to incarceration in kyo-hwa-so penitentiaries or even the kwan-li-so political p
labor camps. The NSA retains discretion to either release those involved in border 
crossing after initial detention, which can last up to several months, or release them to the
People’s Safety Agency for incarceration in locally-managed 
so abor training centers (ro-dong-dan-ryeon-dae).  
 Incarceration in these two types of lower-level facilities was by far the most 
common form of contact with the penal system among our respondents. Of the 102 South
Korea-based survey respondents who reported some incarceration 49 reported spendin
time in a labor-training center and 68, or 23 pe
reported being detained in collection centers.  
 Table 2 summarizes the nature of the four main penal institutions including their 
administration, the nature of the offenses, the prosecutorial process and sentencing, and 
the number of respondents in our 2008 survey of South Korea-based refugees falling into 
each institution. Particularly noteworthy is the porous line between political and crim
activities and the wide range of ac
re
 13
 
Who Gets Arrested and Imprisoned? 
al 
h 
-jeon-
refugees to have been detained for 
illicit b
d 
 a 
deterrent from trying to escape again on release. The risks of repatriation in China are 
                                                
 
The first point of contact with the legal and penal system in North Korea is typically 
either with the National Security Agency (NSA) or the People’s Security Agency (PSA), 
although ad hoc “anti-socialist inspection units” have also recently been deployed to de
with border crossing and trafficking as well as economic crimes. The NSA deals wit
political offenses and conducts the first screening process of those apprehended for 
border crossing or repatriated by Chinese authorities. Just under 30 percent of the 2008 
survey respondents report being detained and questioned by the NSA (Bo-wi-bu).8  The 
exact same share reports being detained and questioned by the criminal police (An
bu) or PSA, with the remaining 40 percent reporting that they were detained and 
questioned by both. It is possible that the high share detained by the NSA or both the 
NSA and the PSA reflects the greater propensity for 
order crossing efforts at some point in time.  
This suspicion gets some support from the results of the earlier Chinese survey. 
Roughly one-quarter of the respondents in our Chinese survey had been repatriated, an
of those repatriated, 26 percent had been repatriated twice and another 15 percent had 
been repatriated three or more times; for these individuals, even imprisonment was not
 
8
 . The People’s Security Agency replaced the Social Safety Agency in 1998, and the 
name of the police was changed from an-jeon-bu to in-min bo-an-sung. However, the 
local police criminal continue to be known colloquially as an-jeon-bu, and we thus used 
this term in the survey.  
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great (Kurlantzik and Mason 2006).9 However, some of those repatriated may have also 
been engaged with cross-border trafficking, business or simply survival efforts, and thus 
further increased their risk of capture and repatriation as a result. About one-fifth of the 
China survey had returned to North Korea voluntarily, with the overwhelming reason 
cited to take money or food back (79 percent and 11 percent of those returning, 
respectively). Quite naturally, those who were repatriated were incarcerated at a 
significantly higher rate than those who returned voluntarily.  
This analysis is extended in Table 3, which reports a multivariate probit analysis 
of the likelihood of being arrested among respondents in the second, South Korea-based 
survey. The probability of being arrested is highly correlated with involvement in private 
market activities, and to a lesser extent participation in an August 3rd unit, a form of 
entrepreneurial activity operated through existing state-owned enterprises and other 
officially-sanctioned entities.10  
Among this sample of refugees, the likelihood of being arrested is also positively 
associated with having an advanced, post-college education, even when controlling for 
occupation; being a professional was negatively correlated with probability of arrest, but 
with a smaller estimated impact.  One possibility is that those with higher levels of 
education are better positioned than others to pursue illicit activities. Another possibility 
is that the regime is more sensitive to the activities of the intelligentsia than other social 
                                                 
9
  It should also be noted that there is credible evidence that refugees detained by Chinese 
authorities are also subject to abuse and even torture prior to repatriation (Amnesty 
International 2000, 2001, 2004; Lee 2006:53). 
10
 See Haggard and Noland (2009a) for more details on the August 3rd movement. 
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groups. Intriguingly, being assigned to a military unit is associated with a higher 
probability of being arrested in this sample.  
Despite the ubiquity of “basic” illicit activities such as market trading, it is 
striking that the prospects of arrest among this group of respondents was significantly 
lower for both laborers and housewives, even though the involvement of housewives in 
the market is widespread. This fact may reflect at least some forbearance where market 
activities are seen as serving primarily survival purposes.  
The North Korean regime has conducted a succession of classification exercises, 
dividing the population into a class of reliable supporters, the basic masses, and the 
“impure class”; these are commonly called  the “core” (haek-sim-gun-jung), “wavering” 
(gi-bon-gye-cheung) and “hostile” (gyo-yang-dae-sang) classes. Family class background 
is a key determinant of life in North Korea (Hunter 1999).11 There is modest evidence 
that being a member of the “wavering” class was positively correlated with likelihood of 
arrest relative to both the “core” and “hostile” classes. 
To what extent have patterns of arrest changed over time? Regressions 3.2-3.4 
include dummy variables marking the period that refugees left North Korea. These 
periods were defined by major turning points in North Korea’s post-famine history: the 
2002 economic reform, which also coincided with the onset of the second nuclear crisis; 
and the 2005 economic retrenchment, when previous reforms were partly reversed. Using 
                                                 
11
 “Core” supporters of the government, including party members, enjoy educational and 
employment preferences, are allowed to live in better-off areas, and have greater access 
to food and other material goods. Those with a “hostile” or disloyal profile, such as 
relatives of people who collaborated with the Japanese during the Japanese occupation, 
landowners, or those who went south during the Korean War, are subjected to a number 
of disadvantages, assigned to the worst schools, jobs and localities, and sometimes wind 
up in labor camps. 
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the year that respondents left North Korea is at best an indirect means of assessing 
whether arrest patterns have changed in response to these events, since incarceration is 
only imperfectly related to time of departure. Nonetheless, the coefficients on these time 
period dummies are statistically insignificant; there is no variation in the likelihood of 
incarceration over time.12 This could be because the respondent’s date of exit is simply 
too imprecise a measure to get at changes in penal practices over time. However, the 
finding could reflect the fact that there is in fact no time trend in the government’s overall 
propensity to incarcerate, even if certain forms of punishment such as labor training have 
become more institutionalized over time.   
In short, there is some suggestive evidence that the authorities disproportionately 
incarcerate politically-suspect populations: those among the wavering classes, those 
involved in economic activities beyond direct state control, and those with higher 
education.  However, the strategy of intimidation is not simply related to detention and 
incarceration, but what happens to inmates once imprisoned. 
 
The Nature of Punishment 
 
North Korean statute has become both more legalistic and complex over time. Perhaps 
due to a desire to conform—at least superficially--with international norms,13 revisions of 
                                                 
12
 For the remainder of the paper, when referring to dates of exit, the pre-1999 period will 
be referred to as the famine era; 1999-2002 as post-famine; 2003-2005, and 2006-present 
as post-retrenchment. 
13
 . North Korean behavior in this regard is complex. On the one hand, the regime has 
vehemently rejected the actions of the UN Council on Human Rights, a political body 
subsidiary to the General Assembly that since 2003 has passed annual resolutions on 
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the legal code have included a number of standard legal protections. Habeas corpus was 
introduced in the 1998 revision to the constitution. The 2004 criminal procedure law 
stipulates that “no one shall be arrested or detained in a manner not provided for in the 
law or without following the procedures prescribed in the law (Art. 177).” As obvious as 
this might appear to anyone living in a liberal democracy, this article in fact overturned 
the use of analogy in the application of criminal law, which granted prosecutors and 
courts wide discretion to charge and sentence defendants for crimes that resembled, but 
did not conform exactly, to existing statute (Han 2006, 3). The law also now stipulates 
that no arrest shall be made without a warrant, that only investigators and “pretrial 
agents” can make an arrest (Art. 180), and that a pre-trial agent making an arrest must 
apply for, and receive, pre-approval from a prosecutor (Art. 181). A number of provisions 
in the 2004 penal code revision even outline harsh penalties for those violating rules 
governing arrest, detention, search and seizure.  
A similar set of provisions appear to pertain with respect to the criminal trial 
process. The National Security Agency is a gatekeeper and retains significant discretion 
                                                                                                                                                 
North Korea’s human rights record.  The DPRK has also refused to meet with special 
rapporteurs or the High Commissioner for Human Rights. On the other hand, North 
Korea appears to have taken a somewhat different stance toward the UN Human Rights 
Committee, a “treaty body” or technical committee of individuals—mostly constitutional 
and international lawyers “treaty body”--that reviews the required implementation reports 
under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The DPRK cooperates 
with UN treaty bodies by submitting implementation reports and by sending 
representatives to Geneva to appear before the review sessions. These review sessions are 
followed by the issue of “Concluding Observations and Recommendations” on how the 
States Parties can improve the implementation of their legal obligations. Some recent 
changes described below appear to have been undertaken to bring North Korean law into 
conformity with standards and recommendations associated with the treaty body process.  
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with respect to all political crimes. But revisions of the Criminal Procedure Law in 2004 
and 2005 stipulate that “all criminal cases shall follow the principles, procedures and 
methods stipulated in the Criminal Procedure Law” and that “trials be conducted at 
appropriate levels of court, and the punishment levels shall be determined by court 
decisions.”  
These procedural changes do not seem to matter: of the 102 respondents in  the 
2008 survey who had been incarcerated, only 13 reported even receiving a trial at all. 
Although the numbers are small, this share does not change significantly among those 
who left after 2005 following the revision of code; of 25 leaving after that date, 3 (12 
percent) report receiving a trial but 22 (88 percent) did not. Moreover, as the low share of 
positive responses suggests, the absence of a trial and conviction was by no means 
limited to those cases that ended up with detention in the political penal-labor camps 
(kwan-li-so) and penitentiaries for more serious crimes (kyo-hwa-so). To the contrary, the 
share of those reporting that they did not receive trials and convictions was even higher 
in the lower level penal institutions: 86 percent of those incarcerated in the labor training 
centers (ro-dong-dan-ryeon-dae) and 91 percent of those who served time in the 
collection centers (jip-kyul-so). The North Korean legal and penal system clearly retains 
an extraordinary level of discretion not only with respect to political crimes, but with 
respect to lower-level infractions as well.  
We do have some evidence that discretion is not only exercised with respect to 
detention, but may be exercised with respect to release as well. Given the duration of 
statutory sentences we expected that those incarcerated would have spent a long time in 
prison. This did not prove to be the case. Table 4 provides information on how long 
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respondents were imprisoned, broken down by type of facility. Average time in prison is 
certainly longer for the political penal-labor camps and the kyo-hwa-so penitentiaries.14 
But the information on collection centers (jip-kyul-so) and labor training centers (ro-
dong-dan-ryeon-dae) is suggestive. Virtually all of those incarcerated in the labor 
training centers are held for less than a year, even though sentencing guidelines suggest 
the ability to hold prisoners up to two years for border crossing. Equally if not more 
interesting are the local level facilities for criminal activities, including economic crimes. 
Sixty-three percent of those incarcerated in these collection centers (jip-kyul-so) were 
released within a month.  
There is much about this system that we do not understand. It is possible that 
inmates are escaping or bribing their way out of detention. However, this information is 
consistent with a model of a police state in which authorities have a high level of 
discretion in detaining, arresting and prosecuting people, but also a high level of 
discretion in their ability to release them. One reason that such a model might be effective 
is precisely because the conditions in the facilities are designed to have a powerful 
deterrent and even psychological impact, in effect terrorizing those who are detained.  
Nearly one-quarter of the sample in the initial, China-based, survey reported 
having been arrested in China and repatriated to North Korea. Nearly 10 percent of the 
respondents reported having been incarcerated in a political detention facility or 
                                                 
14
 Although the number of those incarcerated in the political penal-labor camps is small in 
our sample, this conclusion is certainly warranted from an abundance of other evidence; 
again, Hawk 2003 is exemplary. 
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penitentiary.15 Ninety percent of this group reported witnessing forced starvation, 60 
percent reported witnessing deaths due to beating or torture, 27 percent reported 
witnessing executions. It has been alleged that pregnant women thought to be carrying 
children of possible Chinese paternity have been subject to forced abortions or 
infanticide; 5 percent of the respondents indicated that they had witnessed these practices. 
This pattern of a high rate of affirmative response to general phenomena such as hunger 
in the prison system and a much lower response on the highly specific practice of 
infanticide suggests respondents were not simply providing the answers they believed 
interviewers wanted to hear.  This reassurance makes the response to a final question all 
the more chilling: when asked if they believed that prisoners were used in medical 
experimentation, a practice alleged by Demick (2004) and Cooper (2005) among others, 
55 percent of the respondents believed (but did not necessarily witness) that this had 
occurred at the facilities in which they were incarcerated.  
The psychological impact of these experiences is profound. Incarceration is 
highly correlated with psychological distress akin to post-traumatic stress disorder 
syndrome (Chang, Haggard, and Noland 2008). 
The China survey did not differentiate these experiences by the precise type of 
penal institution (see note 15), but this was a focus of the 2008 South Korea-based survey. 
Table 5 shows the share of respondents by level of penal institution that witnessed 
                                                 
15
 Specifically, we asked whether they had been detained in either a penitentiary (kyo-
hwa-so) or other detention facility for political prisoners (jung-chi-bum su-yong-so); the 
objective was to also capture the NSA’s detention facilities. This wording would leave 
out the lower-level facilities referenced above, the co-called collection centers and labor 
training centers, but the wording is admittedly vulnerable to the interpretation of 
respondent.  
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executions, forced starvation, deaths from beatings or torture, or the killing of newborns. 
The pattern of responses is quite similar to that obtained in the earlier survey: a high 
response rate with respect to generalized forms of abuse, a much lower response rate on 
the highly specific question on infanticide, again lending credence to the responses on the 
other questions. 
In the South Korean survey, the question concerning medical experimentation 
was posed like the other questions as a direct interrogative about what they had witnessed, 
not merely heard. Had the respondent seen with their own eyes medical experimentation 
on prisoners who had received capital punishment? In contrast to the China-based survey, 
none said that they had. This suggests two possible interpretations. The first is that such 
experimentation does not occur.  The second is that it occurs, but no one with direct 
knowledge lives to bear witness to it. Respondents in the Chinese survey may have heard 
about such experimentation, but not have seen it, or been adequately traumatized to 
believe it was possible. By contrast, respondents in the South Korean survey answered 
negatively simply because the bar was set higher by the question: that they had actually 
witnessed such experimentation, something that they were unlikely to do.  
What is striking about these findings is the ubiquity of violence and deprivation 
across the various levels of the prison system and different initial points of contact with 
authorities. The small number of respondents with experience in the political penal-labor 
camps—and the short-time one respondent was incarcerated in one—prohibit any firm 
conclusions about them from our survey, although the record with respect to these 
institutions has now been thoroughly documented by a number of accounts from 
survivors (Kang 2001 in particular).  
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But the findings with respect to lower levels of the prison system are arguably 
even more striking. In both the lower level criminal facilities (the jip-kyul-so collection 
centers) and the labor training centers, nearly half of respondents report seeing executions, 
roughly three-quarters report forced starvation, and nearly a third report witnessing 
deaths from beatings and torture—despite the generally shorter periods of incarceration 
in these lower level facilities. The mean period of incarceration in both types of facility 
was in the range of one month to one year. Prisoners experiencing this typical length of 
incarceration in a jip-kyul-so collection center witnessed abuses at the following rates: 
executions (75 percent), forced starvation (100 percent), and death by torture and 
beatings (50 percent). For the labor training centers incarceration for the typical period of 
time was associated with observing abuses at slightly lower rates: execution (60 percent), 
forced starvation (90 percent), and death by torture or beating (20 percent). Nonetheless, 
the conclusion is clear: even at these lower level facilities, inmates are exposed to 
extreme levels of abuse.    
 
Repression as a Barrier to Collective Action 
 
Not surprisingly, the refugees in both surveys hold overwhelming negative attitudes 
toward the incumbent regime. In the more recent survey of refugees in South Korea 
nearly 87 percent of the respondents disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement 
that the Kim Jong-il regime was getting better.16  More than 90 percent of the 
                                                 
16
 It is possible that the respondents’ perceptions were shaped by information that was 
contemporaneous with the administration of the survey. However, it is a plausible assumption 
that their impressions were shaped predominantly by conditions at the time they left; these were 
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respondents disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement that the economy was 
improving, citing rising materialism (92 percent), corruption (87 percent) and inequality 
(84 percent) as problems (Haggard and Noland 2009a).  
                                                                                                                                                
If anything, the state’s attempts to reassert control over the economy that become 
visible from 2005 exacerbated adverse perceptions of the regime. A striking feature of the 
survey is the very high share of respondents (71 percent) engaged in private trading. 
Among those who left after the state began to reverse earlier reforms, including through 
restrictions on market trading, 85 percent of the respondents reported a need to pay bribes 
to engage in such activities. Official position was seen as valuable by respondents not 
because merit or diligence is rewarded, but because it enables the pursuit of business and 
corrupt or criminal rent extraction.17 
The respondents increasingly hold the North Korean government accountable for 
their plight, with the share placing primary responsibility on the North Korean 
government at more than 95 percent among those who left in the post-retrenchment 
 
their last first-hand experiences with the country, and their responses do not appear to correlate 
either with time spent outside of North Korea or time spent in South Korea. 
17
 When asked the best way to get ahead in North Korea, officialdom (including both 
government and party) trumped either the military or engaging in business, flagged by 80 
percent of the respondents in the post-retrenchment subsample. The share citing 
“engaging in business” more than doubled from 8 percent among respondents departing 
in the famine era to 16 percent for those leaving in the post-2005, with this shift coming 
almost completely at the expense of joining the military. (While the military as an 
institution may be of rising influence in North Korea, low level conscripts appear to be 
treated badly.) When asked “what is the easiest way to make money in North Korea: 
work hard at assigned job; engage in market activities, engage in corrupt or criminal 
activities, none of the above,” the most frequent response was that engaging in market 
activities was the easiest way to make money, but a steadily increasing share—more than 
one-quarter in the post-2005 cohort—saw corruption and criminality as the most lucrative 
career path. There is no sense that fidelity is rewarded; only a small—and falling—share 
reported that working hard at your assigned job yielded fruit.  
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period (i.e. after 2005). The share citing the policies of foreign governments as 
responsible for their predicament—a core claim of the regime--falls steadily from 18 
percent among the famine era leavers, to 4 percent in the post-retrenchment group 
(Haggard and Noland 2009b).  
This growing tendency to hold their government accountable naturally raises the 
question of how these opinions have been formed and the extent that they are 
communicated to others. A striking feature of the marketization process –and one that is 
no doubt seen as dangerous to the regime—is a declining ability to control the flow of 
information. A rising share of respondents and a majority of the final, post-retrenchment 
era subsample report watching or listening to foreign media. Even more striking is that 
efforts to curtail the flow of information do not seem to be working. A falling share (nil 
in the post-retrenchment period) report that they have access to foreign media but decline 
to watch or listen. Not only is foreign media becoming more widely available, inhibitions 
on its consumption are declining as well (Lankov 2007).  
That the refugee population is disaffected and holds the government accountable 
may not be surprising. However, the survey casts important light on the effectiveness of 
repression and the possibilities for collective action as well. The share of respondents 
agreeing or strongly agreeing that the government is increasing restrictions on the 
citizenry remained relatively constant at 55-65 percent across all four subsample periods. 
The shares affirming the statement that people make jokes about the government, while 
rising, never exceeds 45 percent in any of the subsamples, and the share agreeing with the 
statement that people complain about the government never reaches 40 percent. Even 
among an unusually disaffected sub-group of the population, refugees, and despite their 
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overwhelmingly negative assessment of the regime, less than half of the sample report 
that their peers joked or complained about the government.18 
To what extent might the market itself become the locus of overt political conflict 
with the government? In response to the regime’s efforts to control markets, there have 
been occasional reports of incidents in which market traders, mostly women, have 
publicly protested such restraints (Martin and Takayama 2008). Moreover, as previously 
discussed, involvement with the market is correlated with the likelihood of detention. 
Could participation in market activities serve to overcome barriers to collective action?   
Survey responses depict relatively low levels of collective action. When asked 
whether traders cooperated with each other, the share of respondents agreeing or strongly 
agreeing ranged from 32 percent to 42 percent across the four time periods with no 
perceptible trend. Likewise, when asked whether traders in the market were beginning to 
organize to protect their interests, the affirmative response rate was 28-29 percent in all 
time periods—implicit evidence of the continuing atomization of North Korean society.     
Were anti-regime organizing to be effective, the political preferences of the 
respondents are very clear.   The respondents were asked three questions concerning their 
preferences regarding the political organization of the Korean peninsula.  They were first 
asked which alternative more accurately represented their views while in North Korea:  
maintenance of the current North Korean government; installation of a new non-Kim Il-
sungist government in North Korea; unification with South Korea (presumably under 
                                                 
18
 Kim Jong-il appears sacrosanct:   although free discussion of Kim rises steadily among those 
who left the country after 1998, even among those who fled during the post-retrenchment period, 
only 8 percent of the respondents report that people spoke freely about Kim Jong-il, figures 
almost precisely mirroring the shares reporting that people were organizing against the 
government. 
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South Korean leadership given their negative perceptions of the regime in the North); or 
don’t know/none of the above. In addition to their own views at the time of departure, 
respondents were also asked what they believed now and what they believed the 
preferences of other North Koreans were.  
Unification is supported overwhelmingly (figure 1): not only is there little support 
for the maintenance of the status quo (only a single respondent out of 300), there is little 
support for “third way” solutions in which North Korea would remain independent under 
an alternative political regime (Haggard and Noland 2009b).  Exposure to South Korea 
intensifies these preferences at the margin. But the respondents also indicate that their 
own views mirror those of their peers remaining in North Korea, even though there is 
obviously no way of judging the accuracy of this projection. There is a slight tendency 
for these views to be held even more strongly among those who have recently exited 
North Korea. 
 
Conclusion: A Model of Repression in North Korea 
 
The refugee literature provides a much more eloquent testimony to the abusive nature of 
the North Korean system than anything we can add here. However, this brief review of 
the development of the criminal and penal system and evidence from two surveys does 
shed some additional light on the nature of repression in North Korea. First, the 
development of the legal system exhibits at first glance what appear to be contradictory 
trends.  There is a marginal increase in legalization, in the sense of incorporating basic 
legal protections into statute, and a relaxation in the treatment of some crimes related to 
economic survival. The best documented example of this forbearance is the legal 
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treatment of border crossing, which has been demoted from the equivalent of treason to a 
misdemeanor offense, at least for those showing no political motive and avoiding contact 
with “depraved” foreign culture.  
Yet the dominant tendency is the dramatic expansion in the range of economic 
activities deemed criminal, evident in the finding that those engaged in market activities 
were more likely to be incarcerated. Also apparent is the institutionalization of “labor 
training” as a means of dealing with these and other lower-level crimes. These two trends 
can be reconciled by noting that the government maintains a very high level of discretion; 
whatever the law says, the security apparatus is capable of making adjustments in 
detention and incarceration with few checks on its authority. One might expect an uptick 
in detention and incarceration whenever the government is intent on checking market 
activity, as it has been since 2005 in particular (Haggard and Noland 2009a).    
In fact the statistical analysis of detention experiences suggests that the regime 
disproportionately targets politically suspect groups, particularly those involved in 
economic activities beyond direct state control. The penal system subjects them to terror 
in an attempt to keep them atomized and quiescent. A major finding of our paper is that 
conditions in lower level penal facilities approximates in several measurable ways 
conditions in facilities designed to house felons and even the most dangerous political 
prisoners. Of course, incarceration in political penal-labor camps and penitentiaries 
carries much longer sentences, and many prisoners of these penal institutions end up 
dying in them. Yet it is nonetheless surprising that among our respondents, there was 
very little difference in the propensity to witness extreme forms of violence and 
deprivation in the notorious kwan-li-so penal-labor camps and penitentiaries than there 
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was in the lowest-level detention or labor training facility—particularly when taking into 
account the generally shorter periods of incarceration at the lower level facilities.   
In combination, these findings provide insight into how to think about North 
Korean politics, and the centrality of discretion and terror to the maintenance of the 
regime’s power. Obviously, an authoritarian regime has an incentive to mete out 
particularly harsh punishment for those posing political challenges to the regime. 
However, in a fraying socialist system, individuals are of necessity thrown into a variety 
of market-like activities for their sustenance, activities over which the government almost 
by definition exercises less control than activities in the state sector. However, the regime 
has maintained, and perhaps even expanded its discretion to arrest, detain and terrorize 
those operating in this sphere and appears to treat them as harshly as they do either 
common criminals or the most dangerous counter-revolutionaries.  
Such a system obviously has the effect of sowing fear, and labor training has the 
additional benefit of constituting a form of corvee labor or tax. But this pattern of 
detention may also have a somewhat different economic motivation.   Our surveys 
provide evidence of an increase in corruption in North Korea. High levels of discretion 
with respect to arrest and sentencing and very high costs of detention, arrest and 
incarceration actually have the effect of increasing bribe costs. The more arbitrary and 
painful the experience with the penal system, the easier it is for officials to extort money 
for avoiding it. As a result, these features of the penal system not only serve the interests 
of regime maintenance through intimidation, but may provide incentives and 
opportunities for the corruption of the internal security apparatus as well.  
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Table 1. Types of Crimes and Corresponding Place of Detention 
 
 
Category  Correctional Centers Designated location 
Unlimited Term Limited Term Labor Training 
Anti-state, anti-people 
crimes 
Conspiracy to overturn 
the state   
Conspiracy to overturn 
the state   
-- 
(14 types)  (5 types) (14 types)   
Crimes disruptive to 
national defense systems  
--  
Neglecting preparedness 
for wartime production  
Neglecting preparedness 
for wartime production   
 (16 types)   (15 types)  (10 types) 
Crimes injurious to 
socialist economy  
Taking or robbing state 
properties  
Stealing or robbing state 
properties  
Stealing or robbing state 
properties  
(104 types)   (6 types) (83 types)  (76 types)  
Crimes injurious to 
socialist culture  
Smuggling historical 
relics and smuggling 
and selling of narcotics 
Importing and spreading 
depraved culture  
Importing and spreading 
depraved culture 
(26 types)  (3 types)  (25 types)   (16 types)  
Crimes injurious to 
administrative systems   
--  
Collective disturbance; 
Interfering with official 
business  
Interfering with official 
business; Creation or 
dissemination of false 
information 
(39 types)   (30 types)   (29 types)  
Crimes harmful to socialist 
collective life  
--  
Acts of hoodlumism or 
racketeering  
Acts of hoodlumism or 
racketeering  
 (20 types)   (15 types)  (18 types)  
Crimes injuring life or 
damaging property of 
citizens  
Willful murder or 
kidnapping  Willful murder  Excessive self-defense 
(26 types)  (3 types)  (25 types)   (13 types)  
Source: Korean Institute for National Unification's White Papers on Human Rights in North Korea 1009, Table 2-4  
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Table 2. The North Korean Prison System: An Overview 
 
Facility Supervising 
institution 
Offenses Prosecutorial 
process and 
sentencing 
Number in 2008 
sample 
(n=300; number 
incarcerated = 
103). Numbers do 
not sum to 100% 
because of 
multiple 
incarcerations 
Kwan-li-so 
political penal-
labor camps 
National Security 
Agency (Bureau 7) 
Serious political 
and ideological 
crimes, but also 
imprisonment of 
suspect categories 
High level of NSA 
discretion; life 
sentences, 
including for 
extended family; 
confiscation of 
property 
3 (3.9% of those 
incarcerated) 
Kyo-hwa-so 
penitentiaries 
People’s Security 
Agency 
In addition to 
criminal felonies, 
serious crimes 
disruptive of 
national defense, 
injurious to the 
socialist economy, 
injurious to 
socialist culture, 
injurious to 
administration and 
harmful to socialist 
collective life  
Trial and court 
sentencing; 
“limited” terms of 
1-15 years and 
“unlimited” terms 
of more than 15 
years of 
correctional labor. 
9 (11.3%) 
Jip-kyul-so 
collection centers  
People’s Security 
Agency 
More serious 
misdemeanors and 
economic crimes, 
including theft of 
state property, 
spreading 
“depraved 
culture,” some 
border crossing 
Trial and court 
sentencing; 
sentences of six 
months to one 
year. 
68 (75.6%) 
Ro-dong-dan-
ryeon-dae labor 
training centers 
People’s Security 
Agency, operated 
at county or 
municipal level 
In addition to 
lower-level crimes, 
an expansive 
number of 
economic crimes, 
violations of labor 
administration and 
rules governing 
socialist culture 
Initially ad hoc 
rehabilitation 
facilities. 
Institutionalized 
with 2004 revision 
of the penal code 
and expanded use 
of “labor training” 
as punishment. 
Sentences of six 
months to two 
years. 
49 (55.7%) 
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Table3.DetainmentbyBo ?wi ?buorAn ?jeon ?bupolicesinNorthKorea(probitarrested=1)

  
  

(1) (2) (3) (4)
Arrest:DetainedbyeitherBo ?wi ?buorAn ?jeon ?bupolice
Class:Wavering 0.305* 0.307* 0.304* 0.304*
 (0.166) (0.167) (0.166) (0.166)
PrivateActivity 0.561*** 0.581*** 0.570*** 0.562***
 (0.190) (0.194) (0.190) (0.191)
Occupation:Professional  ?0.867**  ?0.880**  ?0.885**  ?0.861**
 (0.386) (0.374) (0.384) (0.386)
Occupation:Housewife  ?1.109***  ?1.170***  ?1.131***  ?1.106***
 (0.251) (0.247) (0.250) (0.251)
Occupation:Laborer  ?0.517***  ?0.532***  ?0.527***  ?0.517***
 (0.181) (0.182) (0.182) (0.181)
Workunit:August3rdunit 0.486* 0.465* 0.500* 0.484*
 (0.259) (0.260) (0.260) (0.259)
Workunit:Army 0.692* 0.625* 0.686* 0.691*
 (0.353) (0.353) (0.351) (0.355)
Education:Postcollege 1.404** 1.386** 1.378** 1.411**
 (0.639) (0.634) (0.642) (0.640)
LeftNorthKoreapost ?reformperiod   ?0.218  
(2003~)  (0.159)  
LeftNorthKoreapost ?judicialreform    ?0.142 
(2005~)   (0.182) 
LeftNorthKoreapost ?retrenchmentperiod    0.045
(2006~)    (0.217)
Constant  ?0.762***  ?0.650***  ?0.727***  ?0.769***
 (0.204) (0.215) (0.211) (0.209)
Observations 300 300 300 300
PseudoR ?squared 0.115 0.120 0.116 0.115
Loglikelihood  ?171.4  ?170.4  ?171.1  ?171.3
Chi ?squared 43.80 47.71 46.19 43.81
***p<0.01,**p<0.05,*p<0.1    
Robuststandarderrorsinparentheses    
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Table 4. Length of Imprisonment by Detention Facility 
  
      
  
Kwan-li-so Kyo-hwa-so Jip-kyul-so Ro-dong-dan-
ryeon-dae 
Less than 1 week Freq 1 2 11 10 
  
Pct 33.33 22.22 16.42 20.41 
Less than 1 month Freq 0 1 31 17 
 
Pct 0 11.11 46.27 34.69 
Less than 1 year Freq 1 2 22 20 
  
Pct 33.33 22.22 32.84 40.82 
Between 1 and 5 years Freq 1 3 3 2 
 
Pct 33.33 33.33 4.48 4.08 
More than 5 years Freq 0 1 0 0 
  
Pct 0 11.11 0 0 
Total Freq 3 9 67 49 
  
Pct 100 100 100 100 
 
 
 
Table 5. Experiences of Violence in the North Korean Prison System 
(Share of those imprisoned in each type of facility) 
 
Kwan-li-so 
N=3 
Kyo-hwa-so 
N=9 
Jip-kyul-so 
N=68 
Ro-dong-dan-
ryeon-dae 
N=49 
While you were detained or imprisoned did you see with your own eyes: 
Executions 66.7 77.8 50.8 47.9 
Forced 
starvation 33.3 66.7 73.1 83.7 
Death from 
being tortured or 
beaten 
33.3 55.6 33.3 30.61 
Killing of 
newborns 0 11.1 7.7 8.3 
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Appendix: Sample Characteristics 
 This paper draws on two refugees surveys. Neither of these surveys was random; 
neither we nor anyone else knows the underlying characteristics of the refugee population, 
and cluster-type techniques used in other contexts to correct for these problems were 
infeasible. Nonetheless, a comparison of the composition of the survey with underlying 
demographic characteristics of the country and what we know about patterns of egress 
suggests that the two surveys are probably a reasonable reflection of the North Korean 
refugee population. The Chang, Haggard and Noland (2008) survey of 1,346 refugees 
was conducted from August 2004 to September 2005 at 11 sites in China by 48 
individuals trained by one of the authors before conducting the interviews.19 Most of the 
respondents were prime age adults, with a median age of 38 years and females slightly 
outnumbering males (52 to 48 percent). As in other surveys, members of lower-income 
classes and residents of the northeast provinces were both overrepresented (cf. Robinson 
et al. 1999, 2001a, 2001b; Lee et al. 2001; Chon et al. 2007 Lee 2007; Kim and Song 
2008; and Lee et al. 2008). Most respondents were laborers (54 percent), with farmers 
(34 percent) the next largest occupational group. Most respondents were from North 
Hamgyong province (57 percent), followed by South Hamgyong province (19 percent); 
these two provinces both felt the brunt of the famine and are geographically proximate to 
the border. Although this distribution of responses actually makes these provinces 
somewhat less overrepresented than in earlier surveys, these provinces account for only 
about 23 percent of the North Korean population (United Nations Population Fund, 2009).  
                                                 
19
 Shenyang, Changchun, Harbin, Yangbin, Tumen, Helong, Hunchun, Dandong, Jilin, 
Tonghua, and Wangqing. 
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The survey of 300 North Korean refugees living in South Korea was conducted in 
November 2008. Again, the overwhelming majority of the second survey was prime age 
adults, with just over half between the ages of 35 and 50, and a larger majority than in the 
Chinese survey accounted for by women (63.3 percent). Residents of the northeast 
provinces were again overrepresented, with North Hamgyong province accounting for 50 
percent of respondents followed by South Hamgyong province with 14.7 percent. It is 
important to underscore, however, that while this overweighting of the northeast limits 
the conclusions that can be drawn from the sample with respect to the North Korean 
population as a whole, it does not necessarily present a problem for drawing inferences 
about the North Korean refugee communities in China and South Korea, which almost 
certainly are similarly skewed. 
The occupational status of the respondents in the second survey is complicated 
somewhat by the large number of women in the sample; 52, or 17.3 percent of 
respondents report that they are housewives. If we look only at those in the economically 
active population—excluding housewives, students and retirees (73 respondents, or just 
under one quarter of the sample)—the largest category among those in the workforce is 
laborers (40.1 percent), followed by government (18.9 percent), and merchants (7.9 
percent, with nearly two thirds of those women); the occupational distribution of the 
South Korea survey thus differs somewhat from the China survey and is more diverse. 
However, a closer inspection reveals that a substantial share of those listing their 
profession as laborers in fact work on collective farms or cooperatives, resulting in an 
occupational mix that is closer to the Chinese survey than it first appears.  
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With respect to political classification, the bulk of respondents were categorized 
as “wavering” (61.7 percent) with 11 percent “hostile” and 13.7 percent reporting that 
they did not know. Nonetheless, 13.7 percent reported being in the “core” group, 
suggesting that even privileged political status did not provide benefits adequate to deter 
migration.  
 
 
 
 
